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Cooperation in Marriage-Related 
Legislation
Catholic politicians and lawyers nd themselves quite o"en in perplexing and demanding situations when they come to take decisions in their conscience 
on issues of marriage-related legislation in parliament and in the law courts. ey 
o"en nd themselves wondering amidst a host of complex ethical issues which 
may have moral implications related to cooperation in evil. For example, how 
should a Catholic politician vote when a law to introduce divorce, civil union or 
gay marriage is presented for voting in parliament? Is there a moral distinction 
for a Catholic parliamentarian voting for civil union between homosexual 
couples and gay marriage? Should a lawyer represent a client seeking a civil 
divorce? How should a Catholic politician vote in parliament on a legislation 
regulating reproductive technologies? Can a judge’s or a parliamentarian’s faith 
prevent them from applying the law faithfully or supporting a new legislation to 
avoid complicity in evil? ese questions are just a small sampling of the myriad 
of moral dilemmas lawyers and politicians face throughout their professional 
careers. 
ese thorny questions would have never emerged had there been little 
con$ict between Catholic teaching on marriage and contemporary civil law. But 
today we are living in pluralistic, multicultural, liberal and secular societies where 
Catholic teaching con$icts with civil law in a host of marriage-related issues. e 
Church, for example, teaches that homosexual conduct is wrong; contemporary 
law protects gay relationships. e Church teaches that marriage is permanent; 
almost all countries have introduced divorce law and consider marriage as 
basically an at-will contract. e Church teaches that procreation should be the 
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result of a natural conjugal sexual act. Laws regulating assisted procreation have 
been introduced in many countries. 
Catholic politicians and lawyers need practical moral guidance on how to 
vote in parliament or how to apply the law in courts in accordance with the 
teachings of the Catholic Church. !e political community has become less 
homogenous in its values and more pluralistic in its vision on marriage-related 
issues. If parliament and the law courts serve the whole community, should a 
particular set of values be imposed on the rest of the community? Which moral 
reasoning should Catholic politicians and lawyers follow for resolving their 
ethical dilemmas? A conscientious Catholic lawyer, judge or politician needs 
guidance on how to resolve fundamental moral con"icts between law and moral 
judgement. 
!is article will #rst explore the basic tool, namely the doctrine of cooperation 
in evil that Catholic moral theology o$ers to handle situations where the moral 
view of politicians or judges con"icts with the legal or political exigencies. 
Cooperation in an unjust law is an area most likely to cause anxiety, as an unduly 
rigorist approach may lead to someone unnecessarily forfeiting his/her job, 
career or peace of mind. !is will be followed by a particular case study involving 
cooperation in a contentious issue which emerged during my experience as a 
member of the European Group of Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE), 
which is a pluralistic, interdisciplinary and independent advisory body to the 
European Commission. !is case study will be discussed because of its relevance 
to the thorny and complex moral question under discussion. !e case study 
made me realize that the traditional Catholic casuistry about cooperation in 
wrongdoing needs to be amply re-evaluated if it is to remain an appropriate tool 
for adequately resolving con"ict situations in today’s pluralistic, multicultural, 
liberal and secular societies. Finally, three speci#c case studies involving 
cooperation in controversial issues of marriage-related legislation, faced recently 
by Maltese politicians, will be discussed in the light of the practical wisdom, new 
insights and boarder horizon acquired through my EGE experience. However, 
since the doctrine of conscience plays a crucial role in the politician’s or lawyer’s 
decision-making process in cases of cooperation in evil, I shall start by discussing 
this moral issue.
!e Role of Conscience 
Catholic politicians and lawyers who are serving society, the common good, 
the justice system and clients, have a moral obligation to take their parliamentary 
or court decisions in accordance with the Church’s moral teachings. !e ethical 
Cooperation in Marriage-Related Legislation – Emmanuel Agius 29
quandaries which confront politicians and lawyers can only be resolved by 
resorting to one’s moral compass, namely one’s well informed and properly formed 
conscience which assists politicians and lawyers in nding the objective truth 
which serves as a guide through complex ethical issues involving cooperation 
in unjust laws. e ultimate goal of a properly formed conscience is to choose 
good and avoid evil. In the nal analysis, a Catholic lawyer and politician must 
properly form their conscience and obey its direction.1 is perspective should 
not be misunderstood as leading to relativism. On the contrary, it insists that 
there is such a thing as objective moral truth, that it is the task of reason to nd it, 
and that as Aquinas put it, “the will is bound to follow reason, right or wrong.”2
Catholics have a serious and lifelong obligation to form their consciences 
in accord with human reason and the teaching of the Church. Conscience is 
not something that allows us to justify doing whatever we want, nor is it a mere 
“feeling” about what we should or should not do. Rather, conscience is the voice 
of God resounding in the human heart, revealing the truth to us and calling us to 
do what is good while shunning what is evil. Conscience always requires serious 
attempts to make sound moral judgments based on the truths of our faith. As 
stated in the  Catechism of the Catholic Church, “conscience is a judgment of 
reason whereby the human person recognizes the moral quality of a concrete 
act that he is going to perform, is in the process of performing, or has already 
completed. In all he says and does, man is obliged to follow faithfully what he 
knows to be just and right.”3 
e passing of unjust laws o!en raises di"cult problems of conscience for 
morally upright people with regard to the issue of cooperation, since they have a 
right to demand not to be forced to take part in morally evil actions. Conscience 
plays a very important role when one is faced with a con#ict situation wherein, 
although evil is not directly intended, some form of unintended evil which is 
unavoidable, has to be tolerated for a proportionate reason due to particular 
circumstances. us, conscience is crucial in the applicability of the principle 
of cooperation which addresses perplexing situations in which the pursuit of 
some good may well involve the toleration of evil. However, moral agents must 
be truly reluctant to do something that requires the toleration of evil. Obviously, 
neither principle should be employed as a method to rationalize participation in 
evil. Conscience is needed to reach a prudential moral judgment to distinguish 
 1 Robert J. Muise, “Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: e Judgment of 
Conscience,” Notre Dame Law Review 71, no. 4 (1996): 774-780.
 2 “Quod omnis voluntas discordans a ratione, sive recta sive errante, semper est mala,” Summa 
"eologiae (S") I-II 19.5c. 
 3 C atechism of the Catholic Church, no. 1778.
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cooperation that is the same as doing evil from cooperation that demonstrates 
a toleration of evil necessitated by an obligation to pursue some proportionate 
good that cannot otherwise be reasonably achieved. 
"e role of conscience in cooperation faced by persons engaged in public life 
has been clearly expressed by John F. Kennedy when he was a candidate for the 
American presidency and spoke to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association 
in September of 1960. He unequivocally remarked as follows: “I do not speak 
for my Church on public matters and the Church does not speak for me.” In 
an o#en overlooked paragraph immediately following this quotation from 
Kennedy’s famous speech, he stated: “But if the time should ever come - and 
I do not concede any con$ict to be remotely possible - when my o%ce would 
require me to either violate my conscience or violate the national interest, then I 
would resign the o%ce; and I hope that any conscientious public servant would 
do likewise.”4
"e fundamental con$ict between the demands of morality and the demands 
of civil law continuously confronts politicians or lawyers in their service for the 
common good. A public o%cial, including a Catholic public o%cial, should 
generally exercise o%cial duties faithfully, but if a choice must be made between 
o%cial duties and conscience, then the o%cial duties must be given up. In his 
encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae, St John Paul II wrote that “sometimes the 
choices which have to be made are di%cult; they may require the sacri&ce of 
prestigious professional positions or the relinquishing of reasonable hopes 
of career advancement. In other cases, it can happen that carrying out certain 
actions, which are provided for by legislation that overall is unjust, but which 
in themselves are indi(erent, or even positive, can serve to protect human lives 
under threat.”5 One must never comply with any legislation that runs counter 
to one’s well-informed conscience. "e doctrine of cooperation is the basic 
tool o(ered by Catholic moral theology to lawyers and politicians to handle 
situations where their conscience is in con$ict with the legal interpretation or 
political exigency.6
 4 John F. Kennedy, “Address to the Greater Houston Ministerial Association (Sept. 12, 
1960),” http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/j+houstonministers.html.
 5 St John Paul II, Encyclical Letter “Evangelium Vitae”: On the Value and Inviolability of 
Human Life (1995), no. 74.
 6 Edward Hartnett, “Catholic Judges and Cooperation in Sin,” University of St "omas 
Journal 4, no.2 (2006): 223-225.
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Role Morality
Some suggest that in con!ict situations politicians and lawyers should 
ignore their conscience and follow a “role morality,” namely, an amoral role 
when voting in parliament or when applying legislation to concrete cases.7 ey 
claim that morality has to do with private life and for this reason it should be 
kept out from professional and political practice. It is important to address role 
morality because of its current popularity in the elds of law and politics. ese 
people claim that Catholic politicians and lawyers cannot check their faith at 
the parliament or courtroom door. A lawyer’s or politician’s personal views of 
morality should have very little, if any, in!uence on the services they render 
to society. ese two professions are at the service of others; they should be 
dedicated to the public good of the State.8 In an amoral perspective in public life, 
the doctrine of cooperation completely loses its relevance and importance since 
the politician and the lawyer should comply with the legal or political exigencies 
rather than follow their conscience. Since Catholics are always obliged to follow 
their conscience, this amoral perspective is morally untenable. 
Professor Stephen L. Pepper describes the amoral role of the lawyer as 
follows: “e traditional view is that if such conduct by the lawyer is lawful, 
then it is morally justiable, even if the same conduct by the layperson is morally 
unacceptable and even if the client’s goals or means are morally unacceptable. As 
long as what a lawyer does is lawful, it is the client who is morally accountable, 
not the lawyer.”9 e underlying moral concepts brought to support the amoral 
role are autonomy and equity. It is claimed that law is a public good intended 
to increase autonomy, and since increasing autonomy is morally good, access to 
already existing laws or the enactment of new laws is morally justied as long as 
they safeguard autonomy and equity. Since the amoral theory exalts autonomy 
above the objective good, it does not accept a conscientious objection position. 
Moreover, the politician cannot decide in conscience not to cooperate in the 
parliamentary approval of a new legislation which enhances autonomy. Nor 
should a judge or a lawyer ever decide in conscience to refrain from applying 
legislation requested by a client because the duties of the legal profession in 
support of autonomy prevail over his/her moral convictions. 
e amoral ethical theory poses two principal problems for the Catholic 
lawyer and politician. First, this theory exalts autonomy above the objective 
 7 Stephen L. Pepper, “e Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defence, a Problem, and some 
Possibilities,” American Bar Foundation Research Journal 11, no.4 (1986): 613-615.
 8 Muise, “Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers,” 790-798.
 9 Pepper, “e lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role,” 613
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good. !e moral object of individual autonomy or free choice is greater than the 
object of the choice. According to Pepper’s theory, one could reason that if a man 
chooses to divorce his wife in a no-fault divorce jurisdiction for no other reason 
than his desire to have a younger and more attractive mate, the lawyer who refuses 
to facilitate the intended adultery would not be a “good person” because he 
would be limiting access to the law through his/her moral screen. Secondly, the 
amoral ethical theory mistakenly frees a lawyer or politician from any measure of 
accountability for assisting his/her client’s immorality or for voting in favour of 
an immoral law. As shall be discussed in the next section, all formal cooperation 
with evil is immoral. As St John Paul II stated, “this cooperation can never be 
justi"ed either by invoking respect for the freedom of others or by appealing 
to the fact that civil law permits it or requires it.”10 A conscientious lawyer or 
politician cannot therefore assume an amoral role in public duties.
Doctrine of Cooperation
Since we live in an imperfect world, it is inevitable that from time to time 
we get involved in cooperation in evil. Indeed, sometimes it is our duty to do 
so. To avoid all cooperation in evil would require that we abandon almost all 
areas of human activity. !e traditional concept of material versus formal 
cooperation with evil is a way of distinguishing types of complicity in certain 
evil acts.11 Formal cooperation occurs when a politician or legislator shares the 
sinful intention and wilfully agrees with the harmful consequences intended in 
legislation, and actively supports or applies the permissive law or even blocks 
someone else’s restrictions to such law or bill. Material cooperation occurs when 
one tolerates legislation without sharing in its sinful intention while attempting 
to limit, as much as possible, the harm done by that law or bill. Catholics are 
“called upon under grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate formally 
in practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary to God’s 
law.”12 Catholics have a responsibility for the evil acts and harmful consequences 
implied in legislative processes when they “cooperate in them: by participating 
directly and voluntarily in them; by ordering, advising, praising or approving 
them; by not disclosing or not hindering them when [they] have an obligation 
to do so; [and] by protecting evil-doers.”13 Scholastic theology subdivided 
 10 Evangelium Vitae, no.74.
 11 Germain Gabriel Grisez, !e Way of the Lord Jesus: Di"cult Moral Questions (Chicago, Ill: 
Franciscan Press, 1997), 871-897.
 12 Evangelium Vitae, no.74.
 13 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no.1868.
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material cooperation into “explicit” and “implicit,” “immediate” and “mediate,” 
“proximate” and “remote.”14
Under the doctrine of cooperation, a politician or lawyer may never formally 
cooperate in the approval of a sinful legislation or its application, but may, in 
some situations, materially cooperate in it for a proportionate reason in certain 
circumstances. e doctrine is by no means limited to judges, lawyers and 
politicians but rather addresses the wide range of situations in which one person 
helps another to sin. And in an interdependent and sinful world, much of what 
we do helps others to sin in some way. James F. Keenan has suggested that the 
doctrine of cooperation “can serve as a paradigm for the modem Christian 
who seeks to make the world a better place by neither compromising values 
nor detaching oneself from a world ridden with complexities.”15 e challenge 
of the Catholic politician and lawyer is to discern in conscience to what extent 
cooperation is morally permissible for the common good without compromising 
his/her values in a world which today has become more and more complicated 
and complex than before.
St John Paul II emphasized the importance of the doctrine of cooperation in 
connection with unjust laws as follows:
e passing of unjust laws oen raises dicult problems of conscience for 
morally upright people with regard to the issue of cooperation, since they have a 
right to demand not to be forced to take part in morally evil actions. Sometimes 
the choices which have to be made are dicult; they may require the sacrice 
of prestigious professional positions or the relinquishing of reasonable hopes 
of career advancement. In other cases, it can happen that carrying out certain 
actions, which are provided for by legislation that overall is unjust, but which 
in themselves are indierent, or even positive, can serve to protect human lives 
under threat. ere may be reason to fear, however, that willingness to carry out 
such actions will not only cause scandal and weaken the necessary opposition to 
attacks on life, but will gradually lead to further capitulation to a mentality of 
permissiveness.
In order to shed light on this dicult question, it is necessary to recall the general 
principles concerning cooperation in evil actions. Christians, like all people of 
good will, are called upon under grave obligation of conscience not to cooperate 
formally in practices which, even if permitted by civil legislation, are contrary 
to God’s law. Indeed, from the moral standpoint, it is never licit to cooperate 
 14 See Anthony Fisher, “Cooperation in Evil: Understanding the Issue,” in Cooperation, 
Complicity and Conscience, ed. Helen Watt (London: e Linacre Centre, 2005), 30-32.
 15 James F. Keenan, “Prophylactics, Toleration, and Cooperation: Contemporary Problems 
and Traditional Principles,” International Philosophical Quarterly 29, no.2 (1989): 218. 
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formally in evil. Such cooperation occurs when an action, either by its very 
nature or by the form it takes in a concrete situation, can be dened as a direct 
participation in an act against innocent human life or a sharing in the immoral 
intention of the person committing it.16
Revisiting the Doctrine of Cooperation
is section focuses on one particular case study involving cooperation which 
I have experienced as member of the European Group of Ethics in Science and New 
Technologies (EGE) when we were compiling an Opinion17 regarding the ethical 
review of research projects involving human embryonic stem cells in connection 
with the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological 
Development (FP7). is experience made me realize that the traditional 
doctrine of cooperation, with all its subtle distinctions devised to resolve moral 
dilemmas in a much less complex world than today, needs to be adequately 
revisited in order to address today’s gamut of ethical challenges emerging in our 
contemporary multicultural, pluralistic, liberal and secular society. 
For research projects involving human embryonic stem cells, FP7 requires an 
“ethical review” not only on a national level (according to national laws), but 
also on a EU level. In view of this “ethical review,” the President of the European 
Commission had requested the EGE to prepare an Opinion setting out “ethical 
guidelines for research projects involving human embryonic stem cells” in the 
context of FP7. 
Participation in the discussions on Opinion no.22 was a revealing experience 
to me and to a few other colleagues on how cooperation with others in a morally 
contentious issue is morally plausible as long as one’s ethical standards are not 
compromised. Although this case implied cooperation with others to raise the 
level of ethical standards of an evaluative system already in force, the moral 
reasoning assumed in this particular context could also be followed, mutatis 
mutandis, in other cases of cooperation in an unjust law submitted for approval 
for the rst time ever in a legislative assembly. 
According to EU policy, each proposal to use human embryonic stem cells 
must successfully pass a scientic evaluation. Proposals which successfully pass 
 16 Evangelium Vitae, no.74. See Angel Rodriguez Luno, “Evangelum Vitae 73: e Catholic 
Lawmaker and the Problem of a Seriously Unjust Law,” Osservatore Romano, September 18, 
2002, http://www.priestsforlife.org/library/1241-evangelium-vitae-73-the-catholic-lawmaker-
and-the-problem-of-a-seriously-unjust-law.
 17 European Commission, “Opinion no.22 on Recommendations on the Ethical Review of 
hESC FP7 research projects, June 2007.” 
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this scientic evaluation are then subject to a stringent ethical review organized 
by the European Commission. e objective of the ethical review is to ensure 
that the European Union does not support research that would not comply 
with fundamental ethical principles,18 and to examine whether the ethical rules 
set out in FP7 are met. In fact, Opinion no.22 explicitly states that “ethically 
responsible research involving human embryonic stem cells must comply with 
fundamental ethical principles and human rights in the European Union, from 
the procurement of stem cells to clinical research based on hESCs.”19 However, 
the crucial issue is how the fundamental ethical principle of human dignity, 
which is the basis of human rights, is to be interpreted and applied. 
e small group of EGE members who had ethical objections to the use of 
embryonic stem cells in scientic research had two options of cooperation: either 
to oppose the opinion and to submit a dissenting opinion, or to work within the 
EGE with the aim of introducing as many ethical requirements as possible in 
order to minimise the number of research projects with human embryonic stem 
cells eligible for EU-funding. ese group members argued that if they chose the 
rst alternative, their dissenting opinion would be easily sidelined. Moreover, 
as a consequence of choosing this option, they would miss the opportunity of 
in!uencing, throughout the entire process of intensive discussions, the ethical 
guidelines for FP7 for the better. erefore, a#er thorough re!ection and long 
discussions among themselves, those members who were contrary, on ethical 
grounds, to hESCs opted to follow the second alternative.
ey insisted on the inclusion in the Opinion that, “as is the case in the 
European Union, there are divergent views within the EGE on the moral 
legitimacy of research on human embryos and hESCs, ranging from objection 
to research involving the destruction of human embryos (which makes the full 
respect of dignity of the human embryo impossible), to a position allowing hESC 
research under certain conditions or on a broader basis.”20 is unequivocal 
assertion has been endorsed in Opinion no.22 since some members of the Group 
had declared at the outset of the discussions that they had fundamental ethical 
objections to the use of embryonic stem cells in scientic research. ey also 
 18 European Commission, Seventh Framework Programme (Decision no.1982/2006/EC), 
Article 6(1): “All the research activities carried out under the Seventh Framework Programme 
shall be carried out in compliance with fundamental ethical principles.” Rules for Participation, 
Article 10: “A proposal … which contravenes fundamental ethical principles … shall not be 
selected. Such a proposal may be excluded from the evaluation and selection procedures at any 
time.” 
 19 Opinion no 22, par. 4.2.1.
 20 Ibid., par. 4.1.
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underlined that they were not ready to make any ethical compromise on this 
issue because any use of human embryonic stem cells in medical research involves 
the destruction of human life and accordingly is against the ethical principles of 
the dignity and the inviolability of a human being who must be respected and 
protected at all stages of its development. 
ey insisted that they were cooperating in the draing of this Opinion since 
the EGE had neither the mandate nor the power to change the political co-
decision already taken by the EU on the funding of research projects involving 
human embryonic stem cells. eir cooperation constituted a political and not an 
ethical compromise. Active participation in the discussions and cooperation in 
the draing of the Opinion constituted the best possible decision taken in those 
particular circumstances for a proportionate reason, given that their intention 
was harm-reduction and the avoidance of scandal. 
us, rather than presenting a dissenting opinion, they advanced strong 
scientic and ethical arguments, to be included in the Opinion, that would 
make it more di$cult for these research projects to be accepted by the ethics 
review board. In other words, the main objective of their strategy was to include 
in Opinion no.22 standards as high as possible so as to make it more and more 
di$cult for these research projects to be accepted for funding under FP7. In 
fact, in comparison to FP6, more stringent rules of selection procedure were 
introduced as a result of this strategy consisting of convincing scientic, legal 
and ethical arguments in support of the dignity and integrity of every human 
being from the moment of fertilisation.
is moral reasoning resembles the line of thought expounded in the 
encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae21 which states that when it is not possible 
to overturn a contentious law or public policy, it is morally licit to present or 
support proposals aiming at limiting the harm done by such policies or laws. Such 
a political (not ethical) compromise does not represent an illicit cooperation 
with an unjust policy, but rather a legitimate and proper attempt to limit the 
evil aspects of EU policy on the funding of research projects involving human 
embryonic stem cells. 
Cooperation: !e Maltese Experience
e following sections will focus on three specic cases of cooperation 
which faced Maltese politicians in instances of controversial marriage-related 
legislation presented in parliament for the rst time during the past ve years. 
 21 Evangelium Vitae, no.73
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In July 2011, Malta’s House of Representatives voted to legalize divorce,22 
following a May 2011 referendum which had 52.67% of voters in favour and 
46.4% against. In parliament, out of sixty-ve representatives, only eleven 
voted against and ve abstained. en in November 2012, Malta’s House 
of Representatives approved the Embryo Protection Bill23 which regulates 
medically assisted procreation, the subject of debate for many years. Less 
than two years later, in April 2014, the Civil Unions Bill24 was approved by 
parliament in its third and nal reading, with all government MPs present 
voting in favour of the bill while all opposition MPs abstained. e bill granted 
same-sex couples with the opportunity to enter legally-recognized civil unions, 
an arrangement which is e!ectively equivalent to marriage in all but name.  But 
while there was a political consensus on introducing civil unions, this was 
lacking on another, more controversial, provision of the law, namely that of 
allowing same-sex couples to jointly apply to adopt children.
Were those politicians who, in conscience, voted in favour of these controversial 
bills which were presented in parliament for the rst time ever, cooperating in 
unjust laws and is their action consequently morally illicit? Is there any distinction 
in moral appraisal between voting for a legislation submitted in parliament for 
the rst time ever to amend an existing law which is considered as unjust, and 
voting in favour of a new law, which is considered as morally contentious? Are 
there circumstances and intentions which render this distinction more subtle 
and di#cult to articulate in today’s complex world, and consequently more 
di#cult to sustain and defend? Can voting in favour of an unjust law presented 
in parliament for the rst time ever be justied as material cooperation, as long 
as one is convinced in conscience that there is a proportionate reason to tolerate 
an imperfect legislation which cannot be abolished, the intent is to limit harm, 
and due measures are taken to avoid causing scandal? Should the omistic 
and neo-Scholastic moral reasoning underpinning the doctrine of cooperation 
be reinterpreted and revaluated in the light of a broader horizon of meaning 
to distinguish more adequately the moral di!erence between the justness and 
unjustness of laws, “permitting” and “tolerating” the harm of a particular law, 
and the intent of the law and the intent of the legislator in order to render this 
traditional moral principle more tting to today’s multicultural, pluralistic, 
 22 “Divorce - Adaption of Various Laws Order, 2012,” http://justiceservices.gov.mt/
DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lp&itemid=23431&l=1.
 23 “e Embryo Protection Act, 2012,” http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.
aspx?app=lp&itemid=24269&l=1.
 24 “e Civil Unions Act, 2013,” http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.
aspx?app=lp&itemid=25586&l=1.
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liberal and secular political communities? Should not the politicians’ conscience 
be given more weight in these thorny decisions? 
Divorce Law
Until October 2011 there was no domestic divorce law in Malta, although 
the validity of divorce obtained overseas had been recognized since 1975. Malta 
and the Philippines were, in fact, the only two countries in the world which did 
not have divorce legislation. In Malta, the Catholic religion enjoys special status 
in virtue of Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic which states that:
(1) e religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion. (2) e 
authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have the duty and the right 
to teach which principles are right and which are wrong. (3) Religious teaching of 
the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all state schools as part 
of compulsory education.25
Some months before the 2011 May referendum on divorce, a declaration 
released in October 2010 by a group of theologians to defend people’s right 
to reach a decision in conscience was approved publicly post factum by the 
Archbishop.26 is position was taken in response to the arguments of some 
Church people who claimed that those who vote for the introduction of divorce 
in the referendum would commit a sin. In other words, they claimed that voting 
in favour of a divorce law constituted a formal cooperation in an unjust law. e 
declaration was meant to throw light on the moral responsibility of every Maltese 
citizen to properly form their conscience and to take seriously into consideration 
the common good of society when taking a position on divorce legislation. e 
declaration stated clearly that the Catholic who, without caring about having 
an informed and formed conscience, decides to follow one’s whim, without 
seriously paying attention to the teaching of God’s Word and of the Church, but 
only follows one’s feelings, one’s own thoughts or personal advantage - if not also 
one’s prejudices - should realize that he/she is not doing one’s duty as a Catholic. 
One is responsible for such action before God and may possibly be sinning. 
However, the statement continues that, aer trying seriously to form one’s 
conscience according to God’s Word and the teaching of the Church and trying 
 25 “e Constitution of Malta,” http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.
aspx?app=lom&itemid=8566.
 26 “Declaration about Conscience and Divorce,” Times of Malta, October 10, 2010, http://
www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20101013/local/influential-priests-to-issue-position-
paper-on-divorce.331054.
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sincerely to discover the whole truth and what really leads to the common good, 
a Catholic:
a) may either reach a right decision or may also in all sincerity reach a decision 
which, in itself, is mistaken. But whatever the case, one is always obliged to follow 
and decide according to one’s conscience;
b) may still, in spite of having all the necessary knowledge and having done 
everything to nd the whole truth, in conscience remain unconvinced with the 
arguments brought against voting for a legislation favouring divorce. is one too 
has the right and the duty to follow one’s conscience;
c) may also see that in this matter one is faced by the choice between two situations 
which in themselves are both harmful to the common good. It is legitimate, in 
this case of conict, for one to choose the lesser evil aer prayer, reection and 
sincere search for the whole truth.27
e Catechism of the Catholic Church speaks clearly about the evil of divorce 
since “it is a grave oence against natural law.”28 is means that participation 
in favour of the introduction of a divorce law by voting in a referendum may 
constitute a case of formal cooperation. For this reason, the declaration was 
important and timely to enlighten citizens’ conscience to be well informed in 
order to take the right decision in their own conscience. A Catholic, who does not 
have any shred of doubt about the indissolubility of marriage, may decide to vote 
in favour of the introduction of the divorce law in a referendum because he/she 
may be convinced in conscience that the introduction of such legislation would 
(a) strengthen the marriage union of those couples who cohabitate; (b) protect 
the vulnerable persons in these relationship; and (c) provide more stability to 
children. Would such decision constitute material or formal cooperation? Do 
these arguments constitute a proportionate reason to decide in conscience to 
vote in favour of the introduction of divorce legislation as long as eorts are done 
to limit as much as possible the possible harms as a result of the proposed law and 
to avoid causing scandal?
Following the May 2011 referendum with a 53% of voters approving 
of divorce legislation, the moral issue was raised concerning how Catholic 
parliamentarians should now vote when the legislation would be presented in 
parliament for approval. Politicians do not only have a fundamental human right 
to decide according to their conscience, but they have a fundamental duty to 
do so. Evidently, a politician has to inform and form his/her conscience. As a 
 27 Ibid. Following this declaration the Maltese bishops sent instructions to confessors giving an 
opposite interpretation of the issue. Catholic politicians thus had two conicting positions both 
approved by the archbishop.
 28 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no.2384.
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representative of the people, a member of parliament cannot disregard popular 
opinion. When such an opinion is sanctioned by a referendum vote, it gains 
more validity. 
Local parliamentarians were faced with a number of options in their 
conscience on how to vote in parliament on the referendum result. An MP who 
has a principled objection to divorce legislation may legitimately (morally and 
politically) decide to vote no. Such a right should be considered as elementary in 
a democracy. In a civilized and democratic society members of parliament have 
the right to conscientious objection to dissent. However, an MP who was against 
the introduction of divorce before the referendum may also arrive at a legitimate 
decision in conscience to abstain or to vote in favour. Deciding to abstain or 
vote in favour of the bill in parliament may constitute a hard decision for a 
Catholic politician who, before the referendum, was convinced in conscience 
and had campaigned against the introduction of divorce. ere might be moral 
uneasiness that abstaining or voting in favour of a divorce legislation would be 
perceived as an ethical compromise and consequently cause scandal to those who 
voted against. is moral reasoning needs to be properly evaluated. 
One may claim that there are sound moral arguments which support a 
politician’s contentious and legitimate decision to vote in favour of divorce 
aer such legislation has been approved by a referendum decision. A 
Catholic politician may come to terms with the democratic decision taken 
in a referendum that the ideal of indissoluble marriage cannot now be legally 
guaranteed. Hence, the politician may decide in conscience to contribute as 
much as possible towards the improvement of the imperfect dra law by making 
it more restrictive in order to limit the harm of divorce. e protection of the 
institution of marriage may be fullled by a Catholic politician throughout 
parliamentary discussions at committee stage, thereby striving to ensure the best 
possible “deal” in the circumstances. Since the decision to participate actively in 
the parliamentary debates does in fact entail a political compromise rather than 
an ethical compromise, the kind of cooperation involved may be considered 
material rather than formal. 
is moral quandary concerning cooperation in the contentious divorce 
legislation is analogous to the experience faced by the small group of members 
within the EGE as discussed in the previous section. In order to avoid the risk 
of scandal, a Catholic politician should also declare publically that he/she is 
voting in favour of the divorce legislation not because he/she had changed his/
her views on the indissolubility of marriage, but rather to respect the democratic 
process. He/she should also make known to the general public his/her eorts 
to improve the dra legislation in order to limit as much as possible the harm 
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of the divorce mentality. is moral reasoning is in line with Evangelium Vitae 
which discusses the position of the Catholic politician when faced by abortion 
legislation, a situation far worse and more complex than the divorce legislation. In 
Evangelium Vitae we !nd that an elected o%cial “could licitly support proposals 
aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law, and at lessening its negative 
consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality. is does not 
in fact represent an illicit cooperation with an unjust law, but rather a legitimate 
and proper attempt to limit its evil aspects.”29  In the case of the Maltese divorce 
legislation, Catholic politicians were not faced with a law which was already in 
force but with a referendum decision which had to be developed into a law.
Another moral issue related to cooperation in the area of divorce legislation is 
when a Catholic lawyer is requested to represent a client seeking a civil divorce. 
Suppose that the client and his wife were married in the Catholic Church. 
According to the Catholic faith, the sacrament of marriage is indissoluble. 
Should the Catholic lawyer agree to represent this client? Is this a meritorious 
claim? If so, how should the lawyer advise the client? e lawyer’s properly 
formed conscience calls him/her to do good and to avoid evil; this is also the 
!rst precept of natural moral law. e teachings of the Church oer guidance for 
the lawyer’s response to the posed questions. 
e Church acknowledges that the physical separation of the married couple 
is necessary in some situations: “e separation of spouses while maintaining the 
marriage bond can be legitimate in certain cases provided for by canon law. If 
civil divorce remains the only possible way of ensuring certain legal rights, the 
care of the children, or the protection of inheritance, it can be tolerated and does 
not constitute a moral oense.”30 In cases where living together is “practically 
impossible,” the Church permits the married couple to live apart. However, 
“the spouses do not cease to be husband and wife before God and so are not 
free to contract a new union.”31 erefore, in agreeing to assist his/her client 
in separating from his wife and obtaining a civil divorce the Catholic lawyer 
would be consistent with Church teaching if living together becomes practically 
impossible. However, if possible, the lawyer should advise the client to seek the 
better solution and reconcile with his wife. Furthermore, the lawyer could advise 
his/her client to seek counselling or spiritual assistance since the lawyer should 
not limit himself/herself to a purely legal solution.
While the Church recognizes that some situations do exist where a married 
couple should be separated physically, the Church also clearly states that if the 
 29 Evangelium Vitae, no.73.
 30 Catechism of the Catholic Church, no.1649.
 31 Ibid.
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divorced couple is remarried civilly, they !nd themselves in a situation that 
objectively contravenes God’s law. us, a lawyer who assists with a civil divorce 
for the purpose of facilitating the remarriage of his/her client, or who is aware 
that his/her client is seeking the divorce with the intent to remarry, would be 
cooperating formally. While the lawyer’s actions may not constitute formal 
cooperation with the immoral act, he/she would be materially cooperating by 
helping to make the wrongdoing possible. erefore, a lawyer may be morally 
culpable depending upon the object of his/her actions, his/her intentions, and 
the circumstances of his/her actions. If he/she knows that his/her actions would 
likely result in an immoral act, some argue that the lawyer should refuse to 
represent this client.32 
IVF Law
Debate on reproductive technologies has been going on in Malta since 1995. 
e issue of assisted procreation had featured many times on the agenda of the 
National Bioethics Committee, of which I have been a member since its inception 
in the early 1990s. Various reports, ethical guidelines, and two dra# legislations 
on reproductive technologies have been submitted by to the Ministry of Health. 
Although Malta was one of the few EU member states where assisted 
procreation was still unregulated, infertility clinics have been o$ering the service 
of IVF to infertile couples for more than two decades. Finally, the long-awaited 
legislation to regulate assisted procreation found its place on the parliamentary 
agenda. A dra# Embryo Protection Bill was presented for public consultation 
in July 2012 and approved on November 26, 2012 a#er months of debate and 
discussions inside and outside parliament, as well as across the political divide. 
Catholic politicians were faced with the moral dilemma whether to support or 
oppose such a bill since Catholic teaching disapproved reproductive technologies 
because they replace, rather than assist, the conjugal act.33 Would voting in 
favour of this proposed legislation constitute formal cooperation in an unjust 
law since it was been presented for voting for the !rst time ever in parliament? 
Are there instances where a Catholic politician may reach a prudential judgment 
in conscience, due to justi!ed and proportionate reasons, to vote in favour of 
a legislation regulating assisted procreation as long as reasonable measures are 
taken to limit harm, and genuine eorts are made to avoid scandal? Should 
 32 Muise, “Professional Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers,” 790. 
 33 Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, “Donum Vitae”: Instruction on Respect for Human 
Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation; Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (1987), 
section II, par.1. 
Cooperation in Marriage-Related Legislation – Emmanuel Agius 43
reproductive technology remain an unregulated practice in a country, thereby 
remaining open to all possible biotechnological risks and abuses? 
e Catholic Church’s moral perspective on IVF is based on the respect of 
three fundamental goods that are considered as essential for human ourishing. 
First, the right to life and to physical integrity of every human being must be 
respected from conception to natural death. Secondly, the institution of marriage 
and the family must be safeguarded. irdly, the inseparable connection between 
the two meanings of the conjugal act, namely the unitive and the procreative 
meaning, is to be respected.
Malta’s Embryo Protection Bill guaranteed full protection to the human 
embryo and speci!cally prohibited third party involvement. In fact, it permitted 
fertilization of a maximum of three embryos in order to avoid the contentious 
issue of supernumerary human embryos and consequently embryo freezing, 
except in those rare cases where this is necessary due to grave and certi!ed force 
majeure.34 A contentious aspect of the bill was the eligibility for IVF treatment 
of unmarried couples living in a stable relationship. We all know that 
relationships within marriage are themselves fragile. But the institutionalization 
of the relationship gives some kind of guarantee of certain stability. If stable 
relationships within couples seeking IVF treatment are in the best interest of 
the child, ethical arguments were raised as to whether access to these techniques 
should not be limited to married couples only, or to those whose relationship is 
at least institutionalized say through a civil union.35 
In their Pastoral Letter36 of 26 July 2012, the Maltese bishops rightly pleaded 
for a public policy on IVF since “it is… a well-known fact that where civil laws 
do not regulate the practice of IVF, there is great disorder.” ey also rightly 
maintain that “civil law in respect of assisted procreation should aim to safeguard 
the three values…, i.e. the value of life and physical integrity of every person, 
the value of the unitive aspect of marriage and the value of human sexuality in 
marriage.” ey also addressed legislators and politician as follows:
We feel that civil law in respect of assisted procreation should aim to safeguard 
the three values we have already mentioned, i.e. the value of life and physical 
integrity of every person, the value of the unitive aspect of marriage and the value 
 34 “Embryo Protection Act,” http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.
aspx?app=lp&itemid=23499&l=1.
 35 Emmanuel Agius, “Public Policy on IVF Issues,” !e Times of Malta, August 14, 2012, http://
www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120814/opinion/Public-policy-in-IVF-issues.432808.
 36 Maltese Episcopal Conference, “Celebrating Human Life,” 26th July, 2012, 
http://www.laikos.org/90%20ITTRA%20PASTORALI%20NICCELEBRAW%20IL-
HAJJA%20ENG.pdf.
44 MELITA THEOLOGICA
of human sexuality in marriage. A law which does not safeguard these values is 
morally wrong. !ere are di"erent levels of ethical gravity emanating out of a law 
that does not respect these values. 
For this reason, men of goodwill who are responsible to draw up legislation are 
duty-bound in conscience to try and achieve the best possible bene#ts, or as far as 
possible, to mitigate dangers.37
!e bishops’ moral reasoning echoed faithfully the teaching of the 
magisterium as pronounced by the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith in 
the “Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of 
Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day” (Donum Vitae), which 
goes even further to state that morality “must sometimes tolerate, for the sake 
of public order, things which it cannot forbid without a greater evil resulting.”38 
!en, this authoritative document of the magisterium continues to explain 
which of the three fundamental goods cherished by morality cannot be traded 
o", namely: “(a) every human being’s right to life and physical integrity from the 
moment of conception until death; (b) the rights of the family and of marriage 
as an institution and, in this area, the child’s right to be conceived, brought into 
the world and brought up by his parents.”39 !is was con#rmed by Pope Benedict 
XVI, then cardinal-prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, in one 
of his dialogues with the Italian philosopher and politician Marcello Pera.40
It is interesting to note that the Maltese bishops referred to “di"erent levels 
of ethical gravity emanating out of a law.” !is statement refers to the “hierarchy 
of truths” which is one of the most neglected themes of the Second Vatican 
Council.41 In his interview with Antonio Spadaro, Pope Francis states that “the 
dogmatic and moral teachings of the Church are not all equivalent.”42 Does 
this perspective apply also to the three values outlined in the bishops’ pastoral 
letter? !is question is pertinent in relation to the principle of cooperation in 
 37 Ibid.
 38 Donum Vitae, section III.
 39 Ibid.
 40 Pope Benedict XVI, Marcello Pera and Michael Moore, Without Roots: !e West, 
Relativism, Christianity, Islam (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 129-133. See also Emmanuel 
Agius, “Morality and Public Policy,” !e Times of Malta, October 28, 2010,
 http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20120407/opinion/!e-moral-and-civil-law-on-
IVF.414406.
 41 Vatican Council II, Decree on Ecumenism: “Unitatis Redintegratio,” no.11.
 42 Antonio Spadaro, “!e Church in a Synodal Journey,” America, Nov 7, 2014, http://
americamagazine.org/church synodal-journey.
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an imperfect law and how the politicians were to vote for the Embryo Protection 
Bill (2012).
Way back in 1990, this moral perspective on the “hierarchy of truths,” 
together with the distinction between morality and public policy, had inspired 
the Episcopal Conference of England and Wales in its reaction to the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act,43 which was publicly discussed at that time. In 
England and Wales, the bishops had declared that they “do not expect to have all 
Catholic moral theology imposed by law, or even adopted as public policy… e 
Catholic Church does not ask that the law of the land should coincide in every 
respect with the moral law.”44
e moral dilemma of Maltese Catholic parliamentarians was whether to vote 
in favour or against the proposed legislation. e dra bill gave full protection 
to the human embryo, but did not protect fully the institution of marriage 
since it permitted IVF treatment to non-married stable couples. In spite of this 
provision, Maltese Catholic parliamentarians decided in conscience to vote in 
favour of the Embryo Protection Bill, even though it was presented for voting 
for the rst time ever. Many argued that they had shouldered their political 
and moral responsibility throughout the entire process of committee stages in 
parliament in order to amend the law in the light of the teaching of the Catholic 
Church. Moreover, they had stated in public that they would have preferred a 
law oering IVF treatment only to married couples in order to safeguard the 
institution of marriage and the interests of protecting children. However, they 
were convinced in conscience that there is a grave and proportionate reason 
to justify their support of the Embryo Protection Bill since Malta could not 
remain within a legal vacuum, exposed to becoming a hub of biotechnological 
experimentations and abuses. eir prudential judgement legitimately led 
them to conclude that it was better to have a legislation which, though morally 
imperfect, sets a clear regulatory framework in defence of human life at all stages 
of its development, and robustly restricts harm by prohibiting all kinds of abuses 
related to reproductive technologies. 
 43 “Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990,” http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1990/37/contents.
 44 Catholic Bishops’ Joint Committee on Bio-Ethical Issues, In Vitro Fertilization: Morality 
and Public Policy: Evidence Submitted to the Government Committee of Inquiry into Human 
Fertilization and Embryology (the Warnock Committee) by the Catholic Bishops’ Joint Committee 
on Bio-Ethical Issues on behalf of the Catholic Bishops of Great Britain (Godalming: Catholic 
Media O%ce, [1985?],5; see also Agius, “Public Policy in IVF issues.” 
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Civil Unions Law
 e introduction of a law on civil unions in the Maltese parliament in September 
2013, granting to the LGBT community the same rights, responsibilities and 
obligations as marriage, including the right to adoption, was another thorny issue 
which irked a number of Catholic politicians on whether to vote in favour or 
against a contentious legislation which, from a Catholic perspective, was morally 
unacceptable. Since the Civil Union Act “equates civil unions with marriage, in 
terms of procedure and substance, in the manner that guarantees equal rights to 
the parties in a civil union as are granted to spouses in a marriage”, some argued 
that the title of the legislation was misleading and deceptive because the wording 
and substance of the law catered for the establishment of gay marriage in all but 
name.45 Parliament gave "nal approval to the legislation on 14 April 2014 by a 
vote of thirty-seven in favour and thirty abstentions. 
 e Catholic Church opposed the law since it went beyond the civil union 
granting protection to heterosexual and homosexual couples from any form 
of discriminations to the recognition of gay marriage.46 e Catholic Church 
teaches that the de"nition of marriage is much more than a matter of public 
opinion. Marriage and the family presuppose a biological datum which we 
need to recognize as part of our respect for our human nature. During the 
consultation process, the Church raised for public re#ection and discussion 
among the civil and political community a number of fundamental questions 
regarding the legal rede"nition of the intrinsic meaning of marriage. Should 
the institution of marriage be made to mean something radically di$erent to 
what it has traditionally meant? Would this #attening of meaning in relation 
to a basic institution enrich the nature and quality of social life? Was not the 
institution of marriage and the family an important public good which required 
the legal protection of the State? Moreover, the Church objected to the granting 
of the right of gay couples to adopt children. Empirical data contrasting children 
reared in a marriage among heterosexual couples with those brought up in a gay 
relationship is still con#icting and inconclusive. In view of these knowledge gaps 
on the probable and uncertain risks on children, the Church asked whether it 
would be more prudent for society to adopt the precautionary principle in this 
domain.47
 45 Emmanuel Agius, “Rights and Civil Union,” Times of Malta, October 24, 2013, http://
www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20131024/opinion/Rights-and-civil-unions.491675.
 46 “Statement by the Maltese Bishops on Civil Union Bill, 16 Oct 2013,” http://gozodiocese.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/113-bishops-statement-eng.pdf.
 47 Ibid.
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In its statement on the Considerations regarding Proposals to give Legal 
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons (2003),48 the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of Faith unequivocally states that “when legislation in favour of 
the recognition of homosexual unions is proposed for the !rst time in a legislative 
assembly, the Catholic law-maker has a moral duty to express his opposition 
clearly and publicly and to vote against it. To vote in favour of a law so harmful 
to the common good is gravely immoral.”49 Following the same moral reasoning 
of the encyclical letter Evangelium Vitae50, it continues that 
when legislation in favour of the recognition of homosexual unions is already in 
force, the Catholic politician must oppose it in the ways that are possible for him 
and make his opposition known; it is his duty to witness to the truth. If it is not 
possible to repeal such a law completely, the Catholic politician… could licitly 
support proposals aimed at limiting the harm done by such a law and at lessening 
its negative consequences at the level of general opinion and public morality,” 
on condition that his “absolute personal opposition” to such laws was clear and 
well known and that the danger of scandal was avoided. is does not mean that 
a more restrictive law in this area could be considered just or even acceptable; 
rather, it is a question of the legitimate and dutiful attempt to obtain at least the 
partial repeal of an unjust law when its total abrogation is not possible at the 
moment.51
The result of the parliamentary vote for The Civil Unions Act indicated the 
clear-cut division between Malta’s two leading political parties. All members 
of the party in Government voted in favour, whereas those belonging to the 
Opposition abstained on moral grounds. During public discussions before 
the vote in parliament, some members of parliament belonging to the latter 
group were convinced in conscience that voting for this legislation did 
not constitute formal but material cooperation. Material cooperation can 
sometimes be morally tolerated for a grave reason. The statement of the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith makes it clear that “one must refrain 
from any kind of formal cooperation in the enactment or application of such 
gravely unjust laws and, as far as possible, from material cooperation on the 
 48 Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal 
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons, June 3, 2003,” http://www.vatican.va/
roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexual-
unions_en.html.
 49 Ibid.
 50 Evangelium Vitae, no.73.
 51 Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, “Considerations regarding Proposals to give Legal 
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons.”
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level of their application. In this area, everyone can exercise the right to 
conscientious objection.”52
Before discussing the moral dilemma faced by Opposition parliamentary 
members, the moral reasoning concerning the Catholic politician’s justi!cation 
in conscience to vote for legislation regulating civil union needs to be discussed. 
e 2003 statement of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith explicitly 
prohibits Catholic politicians from voting for a law on civil union presented 
in parliament for the !rst time because this constitutes formal cooperation in 
evil. However, this moral position needs to be revaluated in the light of the 
emerging historical and political circumstances and the moral consciousness 
and conscientiousness on the politician’s duty to foster a “culture of dignity.” For 
instance, in 1999 the Bishops’ Conference in France had vehemently opposed 
civil union. However, during the campaign for legislation on gay marriages in 
2013, they endorsed an improved “Pact of Civil Solidarity” for homosexuals 
as an alternative to instituting gay marriage. In other words, they supported 
the strengthening of the legal recognition of homosexual relationships, while 
not going so far as to equate such unions with marriage. "is shi# in moral 
perspective moves away from the position defended in the 2003 statement of 
the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith. One may argue that this paradigm 
shi# in moral perspective was justi!ed by the argument of the choice of the 
lesser evil. However, it seems that such argument is untenable, unconvincing 
and inconsistent. "is shi# towards the acceptance of civil union as a preferred 
legal recognition to gay marriage may be the result of the growing consciousness 
and conscientiousness that all persons and minority groups, irrespective of their 
colour, gender or sexual orientation, are to be recognized as belonging to the same 
moral and civic community as the majority, and accordingly legislation must 
be enforced to protect them from any form of discrimination. Moreover, the 
recognition of civil union needs to be perceived from the political community’s 
moral responsibility to foster a “culture of dignity” in which every citizen lives in 
an inclusive culture of recognition between human beings. 
"erefore, as long as civil union is not equated to marriage, one may conclude 
that a Catholic politician is not cooperating formally in an unjust law when 
voting in favour of civil union, even when the legislation is being presented in 
parliament for the !rst time ever, since such a legislation is primarily intended 
to protect the dignity and rights of the LGBT community and to recognize its 
members as fellow humans and fellow citizens, people who belong to the same 
political community and to protect their dignity from discrimination. Where 
 52 Ibid.
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they are inadequately protected, the law has to rectify that situation. In a law-
governed society, stigmatization, unjust discrimination and marginalization 
are to be eradicated in order to promote a “culture of dignity.” To achieve this 
aim, many democratic societies have introduced civil unions to formalize and 
protect the rights and duties of same-sex relationships, particularly in situations 
of vulnerability. 
e local Catholic politicians who were convinced in conscience that voting 
in favour of the Civil Unions Act did not constitute formal cooperation in an 
unjust law but rather material cooperation in an imperfect law argued that, 
since they had engaged themselves actively to improve the law both in public 
debates and in parliament throughout the entire process of discussion at the 
committee stages, and had submitted amendments to limit the negative e!ects 
of the legislation, their main intention of voting in favour was not to promote 
gay marriage or ideology but rather to foster a “culture of dignity” by protecting 
the LGBT community from any form of discrimination. ey had presented 
amendments to distinguish and separate civil unions from marriage, rather than 
assimilating them with each other as the dra legislation did. Moreover, they had 
argued that the legislation should not include the gay couples’ right to apply for 
adoption in view of the knowledge gaps on the wellbeing of children. 
Cooperation with a legislation to foster a “culture of dignity” does not mean 
approval of those elements with run counter to Church doctrine on marriage. 
In spite of their continuous e!orts to improve the bill and to limit its negative 
consequences, the Opposition members of parliament did not succeed to make 
the law more restrictive since government had taken a foregone conclusion 
to go along with the wishes of the LGBT community and their ideology, and 
consequently government seemed to be politically determined not to budge on 
any article of the dra bill. In the absence of political good will to revise the 
proposed legislation, no amendments submitted by the civil society and the 
party in opposition were accepted by government. Members of the House of 
Representatives in opposition made every e!ort throughout the whole process of 
discussion to amend the dra legislation. However, no good will was reciprocated 
from the side of the party in government, which enjoyed an absolute majority, to 
accept the proposed amendments. 
Another option for the parliamentary party in opposition was to give a free 
vote to its members. Were there grave political and moral reasons not to go for 
this option? A divided party in opposition in that particular historical context 
when this bill was being discussed in parliament may have continued to tarnish 
the credibility and weaken the unity of the party in opposition which was then 
recovering from a landslide defeat at the previous polls. e risk of projecting 
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a weak and divided party on such a sensitive issue to the general public may be 
considered as a proportionate reason for not going to the option of a free vote. 
Voting en masse against the bill was also politically untenable since a political 
party cannot be contrary to civil rights. For this reason the opposition party 
opted to take a common stand, namely abstention, due to the divergences of 
con!icting ethical positions among its parliamentary representatives. Maybe this 
was the best option in those circumstances. By abstaining the party in opposition 
wanted to convey the message that it was in agreement with the civil rights 
granted by the bill on civil union, but in disagreement with the civil union’s 
equation with marriage and with the gay couples’ right to adoption. 
However, a considerable number of members of parliament in opposition were 
convinced in conscience that, given that a selective ban on certain contentious 
aspects of the proposed legislation was not politically feasible due to the absolute 
majority enjoyed by government, voting in favour of the bill did not constitute 
formal cooperation since they hade done their best to amend the law in order 
to limit its harm and were prepared to explicate publicly, in order to prevent 
any confusion or scandal, that their main intent of tolerating an imperfect law 
was a political rather than an ethical compromise. ey believed that they had 
a justied proportionate reason to vote in favour of the proposed imperfect 
legislation since their main intent was only to foster a “culture of dignity” by 
defending equality, justice, tolerance, protection of the vulnerable, and non-
discrimination, which are fundamental principles in any democratic society. 
Concluding Re!ections
For many centuries the principle of cooperation has served its purpose in 
assisting those who nd themselves in ambiguous decisions and actions involving 
a mixture of good and evil consequences to reach a prudential judgement how 
to pursue and intend the good while permitting some form of unavoidable evil. 
Because of today’s complexity of human activity, the traditional principle of 
cooperation, particularly in marriage-related legislation, needs to be understood 
from a broader horizon in order to resolve adequately those con!ict situations 
faced by politicians in parliament and lawyers in law courts. In today’s liberal, 
secular and multicultural societies, strict and rigid application of this principle 
to contemporary legal issues on marriage and the family has become perplexing 
and problematic. It has become complicated because today’s life is complicated. 
Its essential moral characteristics, namely the pursuit of the good, the avoidance 
of evil, the witness to the moral truth, the concepts of proportionate reason 
and harm reduction, as well as the avoidance of scandal, cannot be changed 
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and consequently remain highly relevant even today. However, the context of 
their application has changed immensely since today’s life has become more 
demanding, complex and ambiguous. Prudential judgment seems to indicate the 
justication of the application of this principle in certain situations traditionally 
considered as grey areas or even morally unacceptable. Despite its limitations 
which could be surpassed by novel moral insights, this principle denitely remains 
an important feature of moral reasoning for Catholic politicians and lawyers to 
take the best possible decisions in conscience for the sake of the common good, 
both when legislation is discussed in parliament and applied in courtrooms. 
e principle of cooperation, in all its complexity, limitations and novelty, 
remains both a guiding principle for politicians and lawyers in discerning today’s 
complexity of marriage-related legislation and at the same time an eective tool 
to reach prudential judgments in the service of the common good and a “culture 
of dignity.” 
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